In late January 2003 the United Kingdom Treasury and Department for International Development released their proposals for an International Finance Facility (IFF). Here�s the idea in a nutshell:
The Facility is designed to provide additional financing to help meet the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] so that by 2015 every child is in education, infant mortality is reduced by two thirds and maternal mortality by three quarters, and poverty is halved. The founding principle of the IFF is long-term, but conditional, funding guaranteed to the poorest countries by the richest countries. On the basis of these long-term donor commitments, comprising a series of pledges for a flow of annual payments to the IFF, the Facility would leverage in additional money from the international capital markets. It would seek to raise the amount of development aid from just over $50 billion a year today to $100 billion per year in the years to 2015. The Facility would be in existence for around fifteen years, with the period for repaying its borrowing lasting around thirty years.
The full document outlining the plan in detail is available here (pdf)
This could well be a quite significant scheme, so it bears close analysis. Looking over this article, I think I�ve gone off the deep end, so if you like just read this paragraph and the last one. The good points of the IFF plan are that predictability of aid is a good thing, as is early investment of large sums rather than piecemeal efforts over long periods. Money for education today is worth more than money for education tomorrow, so it�s probably worth taking $50bn for free primary education in 2004 and losing the same amount spread over many more years after 2014.
Now for some questions and criticisms.
First of all, will it be a commitment to aid at current levels, or at 0.7% of GNI, which is the level the G7 repeatedly declares as its goal? The Treasury plan says that the IFF will �[enable] the 0.7 per cent target to be met sooner�, but this really just an accounting trick: the 0.7% target is only met if it is met every year, not if you borrow next year�s money to meet it this year. As the World Development Movement says, “If the argument for more money is not won there is nothing to stop countries drastically cutting aid budgets to pay off the bonds when the bills come in”. At the moment, the IFF scheme implies a redirection of aid flows to pay off the IFF bonds after 2015. But if the AIDS epidemic has not been turned around by then, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa may be even more in need of help than they are now.
Another possibility is that aid donors will make their pledges for paying back the bonds after 2015, then promptly cut back on their aid budgets for the years before 2015. Of course, there�s nothing to prevent them doing that right now anyway, but the IFF could end up producing $50bn that makes up the bulk of aid spending every year, rather than $50bn on top of another $50bn of traditional aid. This seems an outside risk, as the IFF plan seems to envisage fairly strict pledges to keep up current aid levels.
Ultimately the developing countries will be the ones paying this back, indirectly at least. And that’s one reason this sounds nothing like the Marshall Plan that transformed Europe after the second World War, despite the comparisons drawn by the IFF plan.
The Marshall Plan was composed almost entirely of grants, not loans, and was on a far larger scale - for several years, the United States funded the plan to the value of between 1 and 2 percent of its GNP. Plus, Germany was able to restructure its (pre-war) debts (after getting two-thirds of them cancelled) so that it didn’t have to pay debt service over the value of 5% of its exports. Today, the G7 and IMF believe that a debt-service-to-exports ratio of 20%-25% is ’sustainable’ for highly indebted poor countries.
Secondly, there�s the question of conditionality. The plan says that ‘No country genuinely pursuing stability and reform’ will be excluded. Meaning what, exactly? Well, amongst other things it means “committing to the Doha development agenda - a sequenced opening up of markets to global trade”.
Now, this is extremely dangerous stuff. For a start, liberalising trade has not been shown to benefit the poorest countries, and sometimes it does exactly the opposite. Rich countries are not pressurising poor countries into liberalisation out of altruism: they do it because it will benefit their own multinationals by carving out new markets, creating new opportunities for financial speculation, and enabling quick profit-making through privatised public services.
Still, the IFF plan proclaims that “Full trade liberalisation globally and trade-related reforms could lift at least three hundred million people out of poverty by 2015″. Which is just bollocks. This is derived from a highly idealistic computer simulation of what would happen if all trade barriers disappeared. It’s based on all sorts of bogus assumptions, and has no bearing on real life whatsoever. What is real are the power inequalities which enable rich countries to maintain their own barriers and subsidies (European agricultural subsidies are rightly criticised in the IFF plan) while their corporations use their massive economic weight to crush local firms in the developing world. The IFF plan says nothing whatsoever about addressing these power inequalities.
Such strong �conditionality� will also undermine the ability of developing countries to negotiate in the WTO. Since WTO negotiations tend to require reciprocal commitments to liberalise, countries that have already liberalised due to the IFF will have a significantly weaker bargaining position. Meanwhile, the IMF and World Bank are still pressuring the same countries to liberalise, deregulate and privatise in exchange for new loans. In fact, IMF approval will probably be required (in the form of an �agreed� Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) before a country can qualify for the IFF - at the moment, all sorts of flows to the South depend on positive reports from the IMF of a country’s efforts towards ‘reform’.
Thirdly, the UK is unusual in having ‘untied’ its aid from requirements to buy British goods or similar conditions. But will other rich countries be as keen to give up this privelege? The US is famously keen on using food aid to further its own export interests, a recent example being the attempt to force African countries to accept emergency food aid in the form of unmilled genetically modified grain, which could have resulted in the �accidental� introduction of GM crops (and associated profit-making opportunities). The IFF plan states that �The capital raised would be disbursed to the poorest countries with each donor using its chosen mechanism�, so while it won�t be as open to manipulation as food aid, it looks like there will still be some element of �tied-ness�. Why not let the United Nations administer the disbursements? After all, it is the most democratic international institution, based on one-country-one-vote rather than one-dollar-one-vote. Oh wait, that�s why. Ah.
Nor does all aid presently go to those most in need, as the plan makes clear: �In 1998, aid per poor person was $950 in the Middle East and North Africa, compared with only $9 per capita for low-income countries as a whole. The European Commission spent only 38 per cent of its Official Development Assistance in low-income countries in 2000�. This will have to change if the IFF is to be fully effective.
Fourthly, It will not have as big an impact on poverty and reaching the MDGs as debt cancellation would. Joseph Hanlon estimates that more than $600bn of third world debts must be cancelled if the MDGs are to be met, as several dozen highly indebted countries cannot meet their present debt service obligations and spend enough on development at the same time.
The IFF plan doesn�t really address this, but says that �The IFF could also be used to help fund further debt relief for existing debts, which for some poor and indebted countries is a valuable instrument to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals�. While it�s good that they recognise that debt relief would be �valuable� (a vast understatement), this again opens up a potential �moral hazard�: the rich countries might scale down their own efforts at debt cancellation and rely on the IFF to do the work for them. However, the definition of development aid does not include debt relief, so any attempt to include debt relief in the IFF will be nothing more than another accounting trick, and a hypocritical and destructive one at that. If this comes to pass, the poor countries will not get their increased aid, and the whole exercise will have been a sham.
To sum up: I can see where the Treasury & DFID are coming from on this, and I admire the general principle. But I�m worried that the plan leaves too many assumptions unquestioned, and may even backfire, giving rich country donors a backdoor towards reducing (or at least avoiding increasing) their aid funding.